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TOWARD EQUITY: PRIORITIZING VULNERABLE
COMMUNITIES IN CLIMATE CHANGE
BEVERLY WRIGHT, PH.D. & EARTHEA NANCE, PH.D.†
I. INTRODUCTION
There is now over two decades of science establishing the existence of
climate change. Gerald Galloway cites eleven major international studies
conducted from 1987 to 2002 that all predict significant climate change induced
hazards, including increased flooding, higher mean atmospheric temperatures,
higher global mean sea levels, increased precipitation, increased droughts,
increased atmospheric moisture-holding capacity, increased heat waves,
increased strength of storms, more energetic waves, storm surges that reach
further inland, under-capacity of urban sewerage and drainage systems,
increased blight, increased vulnerability of port cities, and disproportionate
impacts on disadvantaged population segments.1 Disadvantaged population
groups around the world already bear inequitable environmental burdens.2
However, there is inadequate knowledge of what new disproportionate impacts
will emerge under climate change and what mitigation and adaptation options
disadvantaged populations should pursue.
Much of the climate change discourse recommends transitioning to a
greener economy—clean energy, hybrid cars, energy efficient buildings, green
jobs, et cetera—as a solution to the dual realities of climate change and economic
stagnation.3 However, the consequences of a green transition for disadvantaged
people are often left unstated and unclear. The United Nations warns that
addressing the inequitable distribution of the costs of climate change and the
benefits of a green transition will be the most difficult policy challenge for a
global approach to climate change.4 Vandana Shiva argues that current inequities
between rich and poor have been exacerbated by a global economy that is also
contributing to climate change.5 She identifies increasing food insecurity as a

† Dr. Beverly Wright is a Professor of Sociology at Dillard University and the founder of the
Deep South Center for Environmental Justice. Dr. Earthea Nance is an Assistant Professor of
Environmental Planning at the University of New Orleans.
1. Gerald Galloway, Reacting to Climate Change, Floods, and Uncertainty, NAT. HAZARDS
OBSERVER, July 2009, at 4, 6–7.
2. GORDON MCGRANAHAN ET AL., THE CITIZENS AT RISK: FROM URBAN SANITATION TO
SUSTAINABLE CITIES 14 (2001); UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAM, UN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT
2011 iv (2011) [hereinafter UN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2011].
3. Maywa Montenegro, The Green Collar Solution?, SEED MAG., Apr. 23, 2009, http://
seedmagazine.com/content/article/the_green_collar_solution/.
4. UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAM, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007/2008 5 (2007).
5. Vandana Shiva, Soil Not Oil: Environmental Justice in an Age of Climate Crisis, ALTERNATIVES J.,
Apr. 2009, at 19, 23.
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hazard that will specifically impact disadvantaged people worldwide, and she
recommends bottom-up, community-based solutions such as the organic farming
movement that she has established in India.6
Disadvantaged populations are more vulnerable, because they are unable to
displace environmental threats that would cause them harm. As threats escalate
from local to regional to global in scale, the circumstances and situations these
populations face must be better understood. What strategies and solutions
should disadvantaged communities embrace in preparation for climate change
and a green transition? Can they expect to benefit from the growth of green jobs
or should they expect further burdens? How should they target their local
organizing efforts and what should they ask of their representatives? Some
preliminary answers to these questions can be gained by looking at the case of
New Orleans, a city already experiencing the negative impacts of climate change,
a fossil fuel economy, and inequitable development.
The purpose of this article is to reflect on the local and global dimensions of
inequitable development in light of environmental and economic shifts that
threaten to place further burdens on the most vulnerable communities. This
article focuses on New Orleans as a case study, because it represents inequitable
development and environmental vulnerability, and because New Orleans is
likely experiencing the impacts of both climate change (for example, Hurricane
Katrina) and late stage fossil fuel development (that is, the Deep Water Horizon
oil spill). After a brief description of key concepts in the Background section, the
inequitable development of New Orleans is introduced followed by some
specific examples of the environmental threats confronting its vulnerable
communities. This article concludes with a reflective discussion on how to come
to terms with the escalating risk vulnerable communities will face on top of the
already unacceptable baseline of risk with which they now live.
II. BACKGROUND
This section provides background information on three sets of concepts:
green development versus just development, climate change and the green
energy transition, and environmental vulnerability.
A. Unpacking the Just Versus Green Dichotomy
Development has become more green in the past four decades as
exemplified by expanding grassroots environmental movements around the
globe, by recurring international environmental conferences, and by increasingly
important environmental goals and multilateral agreements. A case in point is
the growth of civil society organizations (CSOs) and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) advocating for health and human rights, such as the
environmental justice and indigenous rights movements. In 2000, there were

6. See id. at 19, 22–23 (arguing the “global supermarket of commodification and
consumerism . . . is destroying our food, our farms, our homes, our towns, and out planet,” and that
solutions will come from biodiverse, ecological farming); see also Vandana Shiva, Organic Movement:
From the Suicide Economy to Living Economics, NAVDANYA, http://www.navdanya.org/organicmovement (last visited Apr. 1, 2012) (describing Dr. Shiva’s organic movement in India).
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approximately 40,000 international CSOs worldwide,7 up from a mere 6,000 in
1990.8 This represents nearly a 670% increase in only one decade. The 1972
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, Sweden is
often cited as the starting point of international cooperation on the environment,
while the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de
Janeiro, Brazil marked a turning point in the expanding role of CSOs, NGOs, and
developing countries in international environmental debates.9 In spite of this
early progress, the 2009 UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen,
Denmark, which failed to arrive at any major agreement on the most widespread
environmental threat we have known—climate change10—is indicative of where
these debates now stand: deadlocked.
As a planet, we are in a stalemate about green versus just development.
Green—denoting alternative energy, sustainable buildings, and resource
efficiency—does not necessarily mean just—as in distributional equity,
consumption reduction, and cleanup of the environment. Groundbreaking
multilateral environmental agreements of recent decades—including the 19811990 International Drinking Water Decade for improving access to clean water,
the 1987 Montreal Protocol for protecting the ozone layer, the 1997 Kyoto
Protocol for reducing greenhouse gases, and the 2000 Millennium Development
Goals for improving global socioeconomic conditions11—have broadened in
scope over time in an attempt to address both the increasingly global nature of
environmental threats and the increasingly unjust distribution of environmental
impacts. Last year’s UN Human Development Report, entitled Sustainability and
Equity: A Better Future for All, argues that critical global challenges of
sustainability and equity must be addressed together and shows how the world’s
most disadvantaged people suffer the most from environmental degradation.12
The majority of people on the planet are people of color (seventy-five
percent are nonwhite) and are very poor by industrialized country standards. As
of 2005, eighty percent of the world’s population lived on less than ten dollars
per day, which is a total of over five billion very poor people.13 What would a
global energy transition mean for the majority of the world’s population? If an
energy transition is to have any positive impact on climate change, it would have

7. JOHN KEANE, GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY? 26 (2001).
8. The Non-Governmental Order: Will NGOs Democratize, or Merely Disrupt, Global Governance?,
THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 9, 1999, http://www.economist.com/node/266250.
9. See, e.g., UN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2011, supra note 2, at 13 (2011).
10. See, e.g., John Vidal et. al, Low Targets, Goals Dropped: Copenhagen Ends in Failure, THE
GUARDIAN, Dec. 18, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/dec/18/copenhagendeal (discussing various, mostly negative, reactions to the 2009 Copenhagen Conference).
11. See MAGGIE BLACK, 1978–1998: LEARNING WHAT WORKS: A 20 YEAR RETROSPECTIVE VIEW ON
INTERNATIONAL WATER AND SANITATION COOPERATION 4, 18 (1998), available at http://www.un.org/
esa/sustdev/sdissues/water/InternationalWaterDecade1981-1990_review.pdf; Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, opened for signature Sept. 16, 1987, 1513 U.N.T.S. 293
(entered into force Jan. 1, 1989); Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, adopted Dec. 11, 1997, 2302 U.N.T.S. 148 (entered into force Feb. 16, 2005); United
Nations Millenium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. Doc A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 18, 2000).
12. UN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2011, supra note 2, at 1.
13. Poverty Facts and Stats, GLOBAL ISSUES, http://www.globalissues.org/article/26/povertyfacts-and-stats#src1 (last visited Mar. 17, 2012).
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to be global in scale, with corresponding global economic and environmental
impacts. It is reasonable to expect that these economic and environmental
impacts would disproportionally affect the world’s most vulnerable population
groups, which makes the energy transition also a justice issue. The just
framework sees affluence, development, and patterns of growth not as inevitable
outcomes, but as part of the problem to be solved. In this sense, the just
framework offers a critique of the economic and environmental impacts of
development based on minimizing negative impacts to currently vulnerable
population groups (that is, intragenerational equity), while the green framework
offers a critique based on minimizing negative impacts to future populations
(that is, intergenerational equity).14
Despite the inclusive language found in international development
documents, in practice, the green sustainability agenda typically excludes the
environmental problems faced by vulnerable population groups. Some scholars
argue that environmental problems are largely differentiated by the level of
affluence of cities.15 Affluent cities, such as Sao Paulo, Brazil have the ability to
displace more of their environmental pollution to regional and global sinks and
thereby keep their immediate environment relatively clean at the expense of
other ecosystems.16 On the other hand, poor cities such as Accra, Ghana do not
have the ability to displace environmental burdens on a grand scale and
therefore tend to degrade their own local or regional environment.17 The
conditions can be described as an epidemiological transition in which poor cities
are faced with immediate threats to human health resulting from local
environmental burdens (for example, waterborne disease, diarrhea, et cetera),
while affluent cities face longer-term threats based on the degradation of global
life support systems (for example, climate change and energy resources).18 This
framework explains why the mainstream green agenda is focused on a concern
for global over local water issues, climate change over indoor air pollution, and
sustainability over justice. Unlike the UN’s approach of integrating sustainability
and equity, some conclude it might be best to keep these aspects distinct to
ensure progress for all areas while recognizing their geographically distinct
needs.19 In other words, the environmental issues of concern in green
sustainability do not automatically include the environmental issues of concern
in environmental justice.20
Economic growth is seen as essential to sustainability,21 while distributional
equity and environmental protection are generally treated as if they were
dispensable, or perhaps even unaffordable. The green sustainability movement
has come a long way in putting environmental objectives on the mainstream
economic development agenda. Sometimes justice objectives are partially

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

MCGRANAHAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 5.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 83.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 157, 160.
Id.
Id. at 4.
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included along with environmental objectives, but here too, distributional equity
is potentially dispensable to the core agenda. As a consequence, the justice
movement struggles for a place on either agenda. The favoring of economic and
global environmental objectives over equity and local environmental objectives
should be recognized as systematically flawed, because both climate change and
an energy transition will disproportionately impact the most vulnerable
population groups (that is, children, elders, disabled, women, people of color,
and people in poverty), who will therefore require additional attention. We also
know that these populations are burdened with a baseline of immediate
environmental threats that are often downplayed in policy discussions. A just
framework prioritizes the needs of vulnerable populations.
B. Climate Change and the Energy Transition
Much of the science of climate change is well-established and widely
dispersed to the global public by organizations such as the United Nations
Environment Programme and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.22
Atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2)—which triggers a “greenhouse effect” that
traps heat in the atmosphere—has increased by thirty percent over the past few
centuries23 and by nine percent since 1992.24 Correspondingly, atmospheric
temperature has increased by 0.7 °C since 186025 and by 0.4 °C since 1992.26 The
global temperature rise results from both naturally occurring greenhouse gases
(GHGs), (for example, CO2, CH4, N2O, H2O, and O3) and human-induced GHG
emissions (for example, CO2, CH4, N2O, CHF3, SF6, HFCs, PFCs, and CFCs)
associated with rapid industrialization and population growth.27 Global
materials extraction has increased by forty-one percent and global population
has increased by twenty-six percent since 1992.28 Seventy-six percent of all GHGs
are emitted collectively by the energy supply sector (especially the burning of
fossil fuels and gas flaring), the industrial manufacturing sector (especially
cement production), the forestry sector (especially deforestation practices), and
the agricultural sector (especially animal husbandry).29 These facts are not
disputed.
Climate change poses multiple potential dangers to the planet. Using the
European Climate Forum’s 2004 conceptualization, “determinative” dangers
posed by climate change are those that are dangerous, unprecedented, and

22. See, e.g., S. SOLOMON ET AL., IPCC CLIMATE CHANGE 2007 REPORT: PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS
(2007); UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME, KEEPING TRACK OF OUR CHANGING ENVIRONMENT: FROM
RIO TO RIO+20 (1992–2012) (2011) [hereinafter KEEPING TRACK]; About DEWA, UNITED NATIONS ENV’T
PROGRAMME, http://www.unep.org/dewa/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2012).
23. Stephen H. Schneider & Janica Lane, An Overview of ‘Dangerous’ Climate Change 2 (2006)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://stephenschneider.stanford.edu/Publications/PDF_
Papers/Schneider-lane.pdf.
24. KEEPING TRACK, supra note 22, at 28.
25. Schneider & Lane, supra note 23, at 2.
26. KEEPING TRACK, supra note 22, at 29.
27. Greenhouse Gases, THE ENVTL. LITERACY COUNCIL, http://www.enviroliteracy.org/article.
php/428.php (last visited Mar. 9, 2011); S. SOLOMON ET AL., supra note 22, at 28–35.
28. KEEPING TRACK, supra note 22, at 2, 16.
29. Id. at 24.
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global in scope, such as the loss of entire ecosystems, extinction of vital species,
loss of human cultures, significant mortality increases, and impacts on water
resources.30 “Early warning” dangers include existing hazards and known
threats that will grow and spread with continued warming, such as glacier
melting, forest fires, and droughts.31 “Regional” dangers are those confined to a
single large region, such as food security, water supply, infrastructure, and
ecosystems.32 Further global temperature increases on the order of up to 1 °C will
likely cause disintegration of the Greenland ice sheet and widespread bleaching
of the coral reefs.33 An increase of up to 2 °C is expected to result in
disintegration of the West Antarctic ice sheet and in broad ecosystem impacts
around the planet.34 Increases of 3–4 °C might shut down thermohaline
circulation in the world’s oceans (that is, decreasing salt content and increasing
the temperature of ocean currents), triggering cooling of the North Atlantic.35 In
general, these global changes will result in worsening local environmental
disasters of all types, including more intense and more frequent droughts, floods,
heat waves, storms, and ultimately, famines. The probability of all of these
predicted effects is under much discussion and ongoing study.36
The expected benefits of transitioning to green energy are: a reduction in
total GHG emissions; mitigation of climate impacts associated with reduced
GHG emissions and reduced fossil fuel extraction and transportation activities;
and an increased reliance on renewable energy sources rather than finite and
increasingly expensive fossil fuels.
But transitioning will produce winners and losers.37 For example, delivery
drivers and commuters will likely pay higher prices for carbon-based fuels, while
fossil fuel workers will likely see their jobs impacted by the transition to nonfossil fuels, and low-income households will likely pay a higher proportion of
their income on heating fuel. Some of these impacts may be offset by increased
green employment in areas such as building retrofits (for example, solar panels)
and weatherproofing for increased energy efficiency.
Furthermore, the cost of not transitioning to a green energy economy would
likely be catastrophic to the competitiveness of U.S. industries, as foreign
competitors in Europe and China have already invested in such a transition.38
Seeing the inevitable end of fossil fuels and the increasing likelihood that fossil
fuels will become less available and more expensive with or without climate
change, many countries have already begun to take serious action.39
As a policy measure, one could argue the benefits of an energy transition
30. Schneider & Lane, supra note 23, at 7.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 10.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See id. at 10–11 (showing each of the stated probabilities with accompanying studies listed as
references and also stating that extensive literature has arisen in recent years).
37. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, AMERICA’S CLIMATE CHOICES 60 (2011).
38. Id. at 61.
39. See id. (stating the importance and efforts China and the European Union’s twenty-seven
member states have already placed on clean and renewable energy industries).
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apart from its impact on GHG emissions and climate change. Nevertheless,
energy, GHGs, and climate change are inextricably linked, and the impacts of an
energy transition on vulnerable populations must be viewed in the context of
climate change as it is highly unlikely that the world will be able to slow or stop
climate change even if the energy transition was to be adopted immediately by
every country in the world. We are left with the reality of having to undergo an
energy transition as part of our adaptation to climate change. Neither event is
optional.
C. Environmental Vulnerabilities
Stephen Schneider and Janica Lane identified the following human
vulnerabilities to climate change: monetary loss, loss of life, risk of hunger, risk
of water shortage, risk of coastal flooding, risk of disease, and risk of forced
migration.40 These are climate-change-specific vulnerabilities that all humans
share. However, many people face a number of existing vulnerabilities that
further limit their ability to absorb and adapt to major stresses like climate
change. Existing education gaps make it harder for vulnerable populations (who
may already be underemployed or unemployed) to obtain the green jobs that
will likely become available in an energy transition, which leads to increases in
poverty and hunger.41 Preexisting environmental justice vulnerabilities make it
harder for vulnerable populations (whose health is already compromised as a
result of existing environmental burdens) to protect themselves against
increasing climate change health burdens, such as waterborne disease.42
Vulnerable populations already living in disaster-prone areas (as a result of
poverty and discrimination) are even more vulnerable to the coming onslaught
of more intense and more frequent storms.
In no other place in the United States are these factors more salient than in
the city of New Orleans, which is directly affected by rising sea levels, increased
flooding, increased storms, and oil-related environmental contamination.
Hurricane Katrina may have been such a climate-change-related event.
Nevertheless, the impacts associated with climate change occur on top of a
baseline of preexisting environmental threats to vulnerable populations in the
city (that is, children, the elderly, people of color, the disabled, women, and the
poor). The next section analyzes the disproportionate impacts experienced by
vulnerable communities in New Orleans during and after Hurricane Katrina.
III. HURRICANE KATRINA: A CASE TO REMEMBER
With the onslaught of Hurricane Katrina and the levee failure in New
Orleans (widely known as “Katrina”), far too many poor people were trapped,
unable to flee or find food and shelter.43 Decades of inept and discriminatory
40. Schneider & Lane, supra note 23, at 9.
41. See JONATHAN ROTHWELL & ALAN BERUBE, EDUCATION, DEMAND, AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN
METROPOLITAN AMERICA 1 (2011) (stating that large education gaps hinder the ability to grow in the
more education-intensive industries, such as health care).
42. See, e.g., MCGRANAHAN, supra note 2, at 14.
43. Mafruza Khan, The Color of Opportunity and the Future of New Orleans: Planning, Rebuilding,
and Social Inclusion After Hurricane Katrina, in RACE, PLACE, AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AFTER
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public policies had created a concentration of racialized poverty in the city.44
Race has greatly influenced our nation’s institutions and systems and has been a
major determinant of access to opportunity and power. The disaster “brought to
the forefront the fundamental problems of structural racism in this country and
its resultant economic, social, and racial segregation.”45
Like many urban enclaves, New Orleans was a very poor city prior to
Katrina.46 The city was mostly comprised of poor people of color living in
declining neighborhoods with a declining tax base, failing schools, and a high
crime rate.47 The labor movement had for years battled for a living wage in a city
dominated by low-wage service sector industries dependent on tourism.48 Blacks
were among the most severely vulnerable population groups and continued to
be excluded from opportunities, while immigrant labor was exploited as a
standard business practice.49
In 1970, the city was forty-two percent black, but by 2000 that number had
risen to sixty-seven percent. While New Orleans elected its first black mayor
during this period (and has elected three in total since that time), the number of
neighborhoods living in concentrated poverty grew by two-thirds.50 During the
thirty-year period from 1970 to 2000, the poverty rate increased from twenty-six
percent to twenty-eight percent.51
Before Katrina, twenty-eight percent of New Orleans’ population was at or
below the poverty level.52 The city as a whole suffered from low wages, poor
education, crime, and unemployment.53 Unfortunately, black residents suffered
considerably more.54 The following information confirms the existence of
concentrated racialized poverty and other demographic and socioeconomic
trends in New Orleans since 1970 and prior to Katrina:


In 2000, median household income for blacks was half that for whites.



More than three times as many blacks were poor than whites (35
percent compared to 11 percent).



Poor blacks were five times more likely than poor whites to live in
extremely poor areas (43 percent compared to 11 percent).



Nearly half (44 percent) of black men 16 and older were unemployed
compared to less than a third (30 percent) of white men.

HURRICANE KATRINA: STRUGGLES TO RECLAIM, REBUILD, AND REVITALIZE NEW ORLEANS AND THE
GULF COAST 205, 205 (Robert D. Bullard & Beverly Wright eds., 2009).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 207–08.
47. Id. at 208.
48. See id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.; ALAN BERUBE & BRUCE KATZ, KATRINA’S WINDOW: CONFRONTING CONCENTRATED
POVERTY ACROSS AMERICA 2–3 (2005).
52. Khan, supra note 43, at 208.
53. Id.
54. BERUBE & KATZ, supra note 51, at 2–3.
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Less than half (41 percent) of black households owned their home
compared to more than half (56 percent) of whites.55

Other vulnerable groups include the disabled, the elderly, and the poor:


Many New Orleanians had disabilities—10.3 percent of 5–20 year-olds,
23.6 percent of 21–64 year-olds, and 50.1 percent of those age 65 and
older had disabilities.



Over 11 percent of New Orleanians were elderly.



More than 105,000 city dwellers did not have a car during Katrina’s
evacuation. Nearly one-third (32.7 percent) of black residents did not
have a car to help get them out of harm’s way compared to less than 10
percent of whites. More than half (52 percent) of poor black residents
lacked access to a car compared to only 17 percent of poor whites.56

Past public policy choices created concentrated and racialized poverty in
New Orleans.57 But post-Katrina rebuilding policies could potentially create
opportunities for all, particularly for historically disenfranchised populations
and for groups that continue to face structural barriers to opportunity. Similarly,
climate change may be the catalyst for a transition to a green economy in which
green jobs and equal access to opportunity could potentially serve to combat
concentrated racialized poverty.
Hurricane Katrina and the failure of the levees demonstrated that the
negative effects of climate change fall heaviest on the poor and people of color.58
This disaster displaced more than 378,000 people from New Orleans, creating
“one of the largest disaster diasporas in U.S. history.”59 Eighty percent of New
Orleans was flooded, but low-income and minority neighborhoods were hit
hardest.60 Nearly thirty percent were living at or below 150% times the poverty
line, and another forty percent were living with incomes below 200% of the
poverty line.61 Thirty-eight of the region’s forty-nine concentrated poverty
neighborhoods were flooded by Katrina.62 These regions tended to be poorer,
have more renters, and be predominantly nonwhite. Approximately eighty
percent of the city’s minority population were residents of the flooded
neighborhoods.63
Unfortunately, pre-storm vulnerabilities continue to limit the participation
55. Khan, supra note 43, at 208 (using the 2000 U.S. Census).
56. Id. at 210 (using the 2000 U.S. Census).
57. Id. at 213.
58. See MICHAEL ERIC DYSON, COME HELL OR HIGH WATER: HURRICANE KATRINA AND THE COLOR
OF DISASTER 4–5 (2006); MANUEL PASTOR ET AL., IN THE WAKE OF THE STORM: ENVIRONMENT, DISASTER
AND RACE AFTER KATRINA 3 (2006); Mike Brunker, FEMA Trailers “Toxic Tin Cans”?, MSNBC.COM (July
23, 2006), http://risingfromruin.msnbc.com/2006/07/are_fema_traile.html (reporting that the
temporary housing offered by FEMA, which is utilized primarily by the poor, is inadequate and in
fact harmful).
59. Rick Jervis, New Orleans May Have Hit Plateau, USA TODAY, Aug. 4, 2008, at A1.
60. BERUBE & KATZ, supra note 51, at 2.
61. THOMAS GABE ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33141, HURRICANE KATRINA: SOCIALDEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF IMPACTED AREAS 16 (2005).
62. Khan, supra note 43, at 210.
63. BERUBE & KATZ, supra note 51, at 2.
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of thousands of disadvantaged individuals and communities in the after-storm
reconstruction, rebuilding, and recovery. In these communities, days of hurt and
loss have become years of grief, dislocation, and displacement. The following
sections examine inequities in more detail for four specific areas of vulnerability:
housing, funding, disasters, and food.
A. Displacing Poor People Through the Destruction of Affordable Housing
All eyes continue to watch New Orleans’ rebuilding efforts and are most
pointedly fixed on how the city addresses the repopulation of its historically
African-American neighborhoods and its decimated vestiges of public housing.
Over 49,000 people lived in public housing before Hurricane Katrina: 20,000
lived in older, large-scale developments such as the St. Bernard Complex, and
29,000 lived in Section 8 rental housing.64 The number of public housing units in
New Orleans was on the decline for more than a decade prior to the disaster.65 In
1996, the city had 13,694 units of conventional public housing.66 In 2005, just
before the disaster, the number had fallen to 7,379.67 Public housing in New
Orleans was among the lowest quality in the nation, and the model on which it
had been designed, whereby poor people were segregated and concentrated, is
now considered outdated and ineffective.68
After the disaster, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) announced it would invest $154 million to rebuild public housing in New
Orleans and would assist the city in bringing displaced residents home,69 but
critics’ fears that government officials and business leaders were planning to
demolish the old projects and privatize public housing have largely been
realized.70 Ten months after the disaster, eighty percent of public housing in New
Orleans remained closed.71 Sixty percent of the largest public housing
developments in the city are boarded up, with the other forty percent in various
states of repair.72
In June 2006, federal housing officials announced that more than 5,000
public housing apartments for the poor would be razed and replaced by
developments for residents from a wider range of incomes.73 The demolition
plan would eliminate 4,500 public housing units in the city while building only
about 800 new units of traditional public housing.74 This move heightened the
64. Robert D. Bullard & Beverly Wright, Race, Place, and the Environment in Post-Katrina New
Orleans, in RACE, PLACE, & ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AFTER HURRICANE KATRINA, supra note 43, at 19,
28. Section 8 housing is a federal housing program that provides housing assistance to low-income
renters and homeowners in the form of rental subsidies. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See DYSON, supra note 58, at 7.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 29.
74. CHRIS KROMM & SUE STURGIS, HURRICANE KATRINA AND THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT: A GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE ON A NATIONAL DISASTER 23 (2008).
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anxiety of many low-income black Katrina survivors who feared they would be
pushed out in favor of higher-income families.75 Again, their fears were well
founded.
Post-disaster economic conditions drove housing prices up and forced
families to compete for the limited supply that remained and for newlyconstructed units.76 An average two-bedroom apartment that would have cost
$676 per month in 2005 rented for $990 in 2010.77 Research shows that housing
discrimination increases when the housing supply is scarce, which hits AfricanAmerican renters and homebuyers especially hard.78 A Greater New Orleans Fair
Housing Action Center study of the New Orleans metropolitan area after the
disaster found discrimination in nearly six out of ten transactions, with AfricanAmericans encountering less favorable treatment based on race.79 Overall, the
post-disaster housing situation resulted in the displacement of hundreds of
thousands of poor New Orleanians, many of whom were African-American, to
places outside the city.80
Katrina allowed “disaster capitalism” to shift into high gear.81 Immediately
after the flood, billions of no-bid contracts were awarded to a handful of
politically connected national contractors; the federal Davis-Bacon Act (which
mandates workers be paid the prevailing wage) was suspended; and a host of
environmental waivers were granted.82 Hurricane Katrina made clear the links
between race and vulnerability. What people often term “natural” disasters or
“acts of God” are in fact acts of social injustice perpetuated by public policies and
business practices on the poor, people of color, and the most vulnerable of our
society—groups least able to withstand such disasters.83 The perpetuation of
injustice continued in the distribution of disaster recovery funds, as described
next.
B. Recovery Funding Equity Analysis
In a preliminary technical report commissioned by the Deep South Center
for Environmental Justice, the planned distribution of hurricane recovery funds
was analyzed for New Orleans’ thirteen planning districts.84 The analysis was

75. Bill Walsh, Feds Oppose Full Replacement of N.O. Public Housing Units; HUD’s Stance Takes
Landrieu by Surprise, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Sept. 26, 2007, at National 3.
76. Bullard & Wright, supra note 64, at 29.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Deborah Barfield Berry, Testers Play Crucial Role in Exposing Discrimination, USA TODAY (Sept. 28, 2007,
1:46 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-09-28-housing-testers_N.htm.
80. NAT’L FAIR HOUSING ALLIANCE, NO HOME FOR THE HOLIDAYS: REPORT ON HOUSING
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST HURRICANE KATRINA SURVIVORS 4–5 (2005).
81. NAOMI KLEIN, THE SHOCK DOCTRINE: THE RISE OF DISASTER CAPITALISM 6 (2008).
82. Beverly Wright & Robert D. Bullard, Afterword: Looking Back to Move Forward, in RACE, PLACE,
& ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AFTER HURRICANE KATRINA, supra note 43, at 265, 266.
83. See John Powell, Toward a Transformative View of Race: The Crisis and Opportunity of Katrina, in
THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS A NATURAL DISASTER: RACE, CLASS AND HURRICANE KATRINA 59, 60
(Chester Hartman & Gregory D. Squires eds., 2006).
84. Paul Mohai & Sangyun Lee, Demographic and Resource Allocation Assessments for the
thirteen New Orleans Planning Districts (Dec. 6, 2010) (unpublished report) (on file with authors).
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based on publicly available information provided in the Unified New Orleans
Plan, a planning document that offers only a snapshot of an ongoing process, yet
served as one of several post-disaster recovery plans with widespread
community involvement.85 The plan presented ninety-five recovery projects at a
total cost of over $1.55 billion.86 Thirty-three percent of this amount was planned
for recovery projects located in Planning Districts 1, 2, and 3 (that is, in the
French Quarter/Central Business District, Garden District, and Uptown), which
were among the least storm-damaged neighborhoods in New Orleans.87 The
remaining sixty-seven percent of recovery expenditures were planned for
Planning Districts 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13—districts that include the
greater proportion of the city’s population and the hardest hit neighborhoods of
Lakeview, Lower Ninth Ward, and New Orleans East.88
Preliminary findings of this equity analysis support the Plan for the Future
map produced by the Bring New Orleans Back Commission.89 This map
displayed: (1) areas identified for immediate rebuilding; (2) areas for
redevelopment, including some areas for new housing for relocated
homeowners; (3) approximate areas identified with the expectation of
development as parks and green spaces; and (4) areas identified for enforcement
of a building moratorium until neighborhoods prove viability.90
The Plan for the Future proposed to significantly reduce the “footprint” or
size of the city of New Orleans, reasoning that a significantly resourceconstrained city would not be able to efficiently serve all neighborhoods when
only a fraction of the pre-storm population and tax base had returned.91 The
citizens of New Orleans largely rejected this plan and spoke against it at
numerous city council and town hall meetings following its introduction to the
public in 2007.92 The plan was rejected by citizens for many reasons, but the most
significant was the perception of inappropriate and heavy-handed government
intrusion into the private lives of citizens effectively denying their individual
right of self-determination and the right to return to the city in which they
lived.93 Ironically, most areas slated for immediate rebuilding and
redevelopment had suffered little, if any, damage from flood waters.94 These

85. THE UNIFIED NEW ORLEANS PLAN, http://www.unifiedneworleansplan.com/home3/ (last
visited Mar. 22, 2012).
86. Mohai & Lee, supra note 84, at 2.
87. See id. at 8, fig. 10 (showing proposed resource allocations by Planning District).
88. See id. at 12, app. A (listing demographics of Planning Districts).
89. Plan for the Future, NOLA.COM, http://www.nola.com/katrina/pdf/planmap.pdf (last
visited Mar. 22, 2012).
90. Id.
91. See Coleman Warner, N.O. Planning Process Puts Residents on Edge, NOLA.COM, Aug. 31, 2006,
http://www.nola.com/katrina/index.ssf/2006/08/no_planning_process_puts_residents_on_edge.ht
ml.
92. E.g., Kate Randall, City Residents Denounce “Bring New Orleans Back” Rebuilding Plan,
WSWS.ORG, Jan. 14, 2006, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2006/jan2006/newo-j14.shtml; Michelle
Krupa, Many Areas Marked for Green Space After Hurricane Katrina Have Rebounded, NOLA.COM, Aug.
23, 2010, http://www.nola.com/katrina/index.ssf/2010/08/many_areas_marked_for_green_space
_after_hurricane_katrina_have_rebounded.html.
93. See Warner, supra note 91.
94. Plan for the Future, supra note 89; Warner, supra note 91.
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areas were also predominantly white and affluent, while areas identified for
conversion into green space and parks and areas required to prove their viability
were predominantly African-American and less affluent.95 The plan also
appeared to ignore the fact that New Orleans had started losing population in
the 1960s, resulting in significant blight and an insufficient tax base decades
before Hurricane Katrina.96 This only fueled the feeling among many residents
that the storm was being used as an excuse to prevent certain neighborhoods
from returning.97
To put these facts into context, there are thirteen planning districts in New
Orleans, four of which are predominantly white (Planning Districts 1, 5, 11, and
13). Eight planning districts are majority black (Planning Districts 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9,
10, and 12)98 The four predominantly white planning districts (n=4) were
allocated a combined total of $208 million for redevelopment, which exceeds by a
factor of two the $204 million allocated to a total of eight predominantly black
planning districts.99 These findings, while disturbing, are not surprising to
researchers, activists, and scholars who routinely illuminate environmental
injustices and who regularly monitor governmental disaster response actions.
Hurricane Katrina focused a magnifying lens on the environmental injustices
suffered by the people of New Orleans immediately prior to, during, and after
the storm.100 The citizens of New Orleans were actively engaged in a process to
determine the direction, size, and scope of the rebuilding, including the
allocation of recovery funding.101 This preliminary equity analysis reveals a key
feature of New Orleans’ recovery. Principles for ensuring equitable distribution
of recovery funds were not in effect. To this day, parts of the city are “back”
while others are still languishing. Inequities continued in the next disaster when
vulnerable population groups were disproportionately affected by an oil spill.
C. Disproportionate Impacts of the Deep Water Horizon Disaster
On the heels of the recovery from Katrina, the Gulf Coast experienced
another devastating blow: the British Petroleum (BP) Deep Water Horizon Oil
Disaster. The massive oil spill killed eleven workers and leaked 205.8 million
gallons of oil into the Gulf of Mexico, surpassing the record-setting 140-million
gallon Ixtoc oil spill on Mexico’s coast from 1979 to 1980.102 The Deep Water

95. See Mohai & Lee, supra note 84, at 12, app. A (listing demographics of Planning Districts).
96. See generally, GREATER NEW ORLEANS CMTY. DATA CTR., POPULATION LOSS AND VACANT
HOUSING IN NEW ORLEANS NEIGHBORHOODS (2011), available at https://gnocdc.s3.amazonaws.com/
reports/GNOCDC_PopulationLossAndVacantHousingInNewOrleansNeighborhoods.pdf;
New
Orleans History, TUREAUD.COM, http://www.tureaud.com/Southern/new_orleans_history.htm (last
visited Apr. 25, 2012).
97. Warner, supra note 91.
98. Planning District 3, located in “uptown” New Orleans, is neither majority black nor majority
white with 47.28% whites and 46.37% blacks. Mohai & Lee, supra note 84, at 1.
99. Id. at 10 fig. 14.
100. PASTOR ET AL., supra note 58, at 3.
101. See id. at 36.
102. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEP
WATER: THE GULF OIL SPILL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING 55 (2011) [hereinafter
DEEP WATER]; Jeremy Repanich, The Deepwater Horizon Spill by the Numbers, POPULAR MECHANICS,
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Horizon spill contaminated 665 miles of coastline, imperiled the multi-billion
dollar fishing and tourism industries, and killed birds, sea turtles, dolphins, and
other marine life.103 The full health, environmental, and economic impacts of this
catastrophe may not become clear for decades.
While the media spotlight focused attention on efforts to stop the massive
oil leak and the cleanup of the spill, the same level of attention was not given to
oil spill waste disposal.104 The largest amount of BP oil spill solid waste (14,228
tons) was sent to a landfill in Campbellton, Florida, a community where threefourths of the residents are people of color.105 Although African-Americans make
up about thirty-two percent of Louisiana’s population, three of the five approved
landfills (sixty percent) in Louisiana that have received BP oil spill waste are
located in predominantly-black communities.106
People of color are disproportionately impacted by the environmental
effects of hazardous waste disposal. They make up the majority (fifty-six percent)
of those living in neighborhoods within two miles of the nation’s commercial
hazardous waste facilities, nearly double the percentage living in areas beyond
two miles (thirty percent).107 People of color make up a much larger majority
(sixty-nine percent) in neighborhoods with clustered polluting facilities.108 Siting
disparities are widespread. Nine out of ten Environmental Protection Agency
regions have racial disparities in the location of hazardous waste sites.109 Forty of
forty-four states (ninety percent) with hazardous waste facilities have
disproportionately high percentages of people of color in host neighborhoods—
on average about two times greater than the percentages in non-host areas (fortyfour percent versus twenty-three percent).110 Host neighborhoods in an
overwhelming majority of the forty-four states with hazardous waste sites have
disproportionately high percentages of Hispanics (thirty-five states), AfricanAmericans (thirty-eight states), and Asians/Pacific Islanders (twenty-seven
states).111 Host neighborhoods of 105 out of 149 metropolitan areas with
hazardous waste sites (seventy percent) have disproportionately high
percentages of people of color, and forty-six of these metro areas (thirty-one
percent) have host neighborhoods comprised of a majority of people of color.112
Because people of color live in close proximity to hazardous waste facilities,
they are disproportionately exposed to environmental pollutants. Residents

Aug. 10, 2010, http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/energy/coal-oil-gas/bp-oil-spillstatistics; Ten Famous Spills, INCIDENT NEWS, http://www.incidentnews.gov/famous (last visited
Mar. 23, 2012).
103. Repanich, supra note 102; DEEP WATER, supra note 102, at 181, 185.
104. Robert Bullard, BP’s Waste Management Plans Raise Environmental Justice Concerns, DISSIDENT
VOICE, July 29, 2010, http://dissidentvoice.org/2010/07/bp%E2%80%99s-waste-management-planraises-environmental-justice-concerns/.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. ROBERT BULLARD ET AL., TOXIC WASTES AND RACE AT TWENTY: 1987–2007, at 42–45 (2007).
108. Id. at xi.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 73–75.
112. Id. at 60.
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living near the sites selected for the disposal of BP oil spill wastes are at a greater
risk of increased exposure not only from the environmental pollutants from these
waste sites, but also from air pollution resulting from increased diesel truck
traffic to and from these facilities.113 Attempts to develop green energy from
waste as a sustainable, climate-friendly practice still fail to consider the
disproportionate impacts on vulnerable populations, as discussed below.
D. Waste-to-Energy: Green Energy or Environmental Injustice?
Research is replete with data supporting the disproportionate exposure of
minority and poor communities to hazardous waste facilities and the disparities
in clustering waste facilities within three kilometers of these communities.114
These vulnerable communities have become increasingly more endangered by
the threat of new and risky technologies for waste disposal.
Over the past ten years, plasma arc technology has emerged as a potential
trend for renewable energy in waste management.115 The City of New Orleans is
the latest target for this experimental technology. The selected site for the project
is the neighborhood of New Orleans East, the largest African-American
community in the city (located in Planning District 9).116 New Orleans East has
an industrial park that is zoned as heavy industrial, and for a long time, the
neighborhood has served as a garbage dumping ground for the city and
surrounding parishes.117 The neighborhood currently has twenty-three illegal
dumpsites and numerous inactive and active landfills.118 The city of New Orleans
does not have a comprehensive waste management plan to rationally manage
this problem.
According to the Deep South Center for Environmental Justice (DSCEJ),
“Sun Energy, [in partnership with Air Products,] through a joint venture
company, Louisiana Gasification Facility LLC (LGF), propose[d] to build, own
and operate what they call an ‘energy from waste . . . facility’ [in New Orleans
East]. The LGF would use ‘Plasma Arc Gasification[.]’”119 Sun Energy claims that
the technology is not incineration, per se.120 However, though company websites,
diagrams, and process descriptions claim the technology is a renewable energy
facility, the proposed technology would in fact have the same polluting effect as

113. See id. at 86, 126.
114. Id. at 42–45.
115. See SOLENA GROUP, THE COMMERCIAL VIABILITY OF PLASMA ARC TECHNOLOGY 2,
http://www.solenagroup.com/files/plasma.pdf. Plasma arc technology developed more than a
century ago to provide extremely high heat in the metal industry; currently the technology has
applications in the chemical, metallurgical, and waste management industries. Id.
116. See PETER BENNETT ET AL., NEW ORLEANS EAST BROWNFIELDS SURVEY 1–2 (2011), http://
www.dscej.org/images/stories/pdfs/brownfields%20survey%20final.pdf.
117. Id. at 3, 19.
118. Id.
119. Gulf Coast Community Residents Participate in BP Landfill Waste Community Training in
Avondale, Louisiana, DEEP SOUTH CTR. FOR ENVTL. JUST. http://www.dscej.org/ (last visited Mar. 31,
2012) [hereinafter DSCEJ]; see also Renewable Energy, SUN ENERGY GROUP, LLC, http://www.
sunenergygrp.com/renewable_energy.shtml (last visited Mar. 31, 2012) [hereinafter SUN ENERGY
GROUP].
120. SUN ENERGY GROUP, supra note 119; see also DSCEJ, supra note 119.
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a two-stage incinerator.121
While there are differences between traditional incineration technologies
and plasma arc technology, the system proposed by Sun Energy involves
incineration/combustion as an essential component.122 One difference is that
while traditional incinerators burn the waste directly, plasma arc heats the waste
in the gasification stage, creating a synthetic gas (or “syngas”). Key to the
technology proposed by Sun Energy is the burning of the syngas in a turbine or
boiler.123 This combustion process is the incineration that results in emissions of
toxic and criteria air pollutants into a neighborhood already overloaded with air
pollution. These emissions would include dioxins and furans, highly toxic
chemicals linked to a wide range of profound illnesses including cancer,
reproductive, developmental, and immunological diseases. Plasma arc facilities
around the country have been plagued with failed equipment and no merit of
energy production from the syngas technology has been shown.124 This new and
risky technology represents the latest threat to New Orleans’ vulnerable
communities. In our final example below, this article notes the inequities in
access to healthy food as yet another measure of vulnerability commonly ignored
by policymakers.
E. Food Deserts in the City of Food
The New Orleans metropolitan region is characterized by entrenched,
segregated urban poverty, in which poor families—in this case mostly AfricanAmerican families—live in neighborhoods that are distressed in myriad ways.
New Orleans’ poor neighborhoods suffer from severe social and economic
distress, measured as consistently high poverty rates, high unemployment rates,
low education rates, poor quality housing, low access to healthy foods, low
quality schools, limited transportation, and so forth.125 These facts were true both
before and after the Katrina and Deepwater Horizon disasters; for example, the
city’s pre-Katrina 2004 poverty rate was approximately twenty-three percent and
its post-Katrina 2009 poverty rate was just below twenty-four percent.126 One

121. DSCEJ, supra note 119; see also GREENACTION FOR HEALTH & ENVTL. JUST., EVALUATION OF
SUN ENERGY GROUP’S WEBSITE CLAIMS: JULY 7, 2009, CLAIMS VERSUS REALITY 1, http://www.
greenaction.org/incinerators/neworleans/documents/FactSheetSunEnergyWebClaims.pdf
(“Sun
Energy’s permit application has many references to the ‘combustion’ of the syngas, which is the
incineration stage in the plasma arc gasification process.”); GLOBAL ALLIANCE FOR INCINERATOR
ALTERNATIVES, GREENACTION FOR HEALTH AND ENVTL. JUST., PLASMA ARC TECHNOLOGY FOR
MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE: A PROVEN TECHNOLOGY OR INCINERATOR IN DISGUISE? WILL FLORIDA’S
HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT BE PROTECTED? 3–5 (2008), http://greenaction.org/incinerators/
documents/GreenactionGAIAExposeOfFloridaPlasmaArcIncineratorInDisguiseProposals030908.pdf.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. BERUBE & KATZ, supra note 51, at 1–3.
126. Id. at 2 (“Between 2003 and 2004, the percentage of parish residents living below the poverty
line rose from 20.8 percent to 23.2 percent.”); New Orleans, Louisiana (LA) Poverty Rate Data, CITYDATA, http://www.city-data.com/poverty/poverty-New-Orleans-Louisiana.html (last visited Mar.
16, 2012); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TABLE 708: HOUSEHOLD INCOME, FAMILY INCOME, PER CAPITA INCOME,
AND INDIVIDUALS AND FAMILIES BELOW POVERTY LEVEL BY CITY: 2009, available at
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0708.xls.
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could focus on any one of these poverty indicators to see clearly the inequities of
life in New Orleans. This section analyzes healthy food access.
In September 2011, NewsOne.com issued a special report concluding that
New Orleans was the worst urban food desert in the United States.127 The report
defined food deserts as urban areas with the following characteristics: “(a) a lack
or absence of large grocery stores and supermarkets that sell fresh produce and
healthy food options; and (b) low-income populations living on tight budgets.”128
Backing up this announcement was a 2007 study by the New Orleans Food
Policy Advisory Committee documenting the lack of healthy food access in New
Orleans and demonstrating that access had become even worse after Hurricane
Katrina.129 In 2007, nearly sixty percent of low-income residents had to travel
three miles or more to a grocery store, and only eighteen out of thirty-five fullservice grocery stores were reopened two years after the storm; most of the
grocery stores were concentrated in affluent neighborhoods while poor
neighborhoods had a predominance of liquor stores and fast food outlets.130
These findings contrast sharply with New Orleans’ well-deserved reputation for
food culture and fine dining. In the same month that New Orleans was declared
the worst urban food desert, the September 2011 issue of Travel and Leisure
Magazine declared New Orleans America’s best city to visit for “food, drinks,
and restaurants,” the best city for “foodies,” and the best city for “neighborhood
joints and cafes.” New Orleans also came in second place for “ethnic food.”131
Ironically, New Orleans is world famous for its distinct cuisine, and yet a large
percentage of its population lacks access to healthy food.
Food access is both a local and a global issue that intersects with climate
change, energy, and inequity. Every quantitative and qualitative assessment
available has found that climate change will adversely affect global food security
in terms of food availability, stability of the food supply, food utilization and
disease, and food access.132 Josef Schmidhuber and Francesco Tubiello found that
these impacts are the result of: changes in temperature and precipitation that
reduce agricultural land and crop yields; pronounced variability in weather
patterns; increases in infectious, waterborne, vector-borne, and foodborne
diseases; and higher food prices and reduced agricultural incomes.133 These
negative impacts will fall disproportionately on the poor, especially in
developing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia.134 Shiva connects

127. America’s Worst 9 Urban Food Deserts, NEWSONE.COM, Sept. 22, 2011, http://newsone.com/
newsone-original/jothomas/americas-worst-9-urban-food-deserts/.
128. Id.
129. NEW ORLEANS FOOD POLICY ADVISORY COMM., BUILDING HEALTH COMMUNITIES: EXPANDING
ACCESS TO FRESH FOOD RETAIL 1 (2007), available at http://www.thefoodtrust.org/catalog/download.
php?product_id=142.
130. See id. at 5.
131. America’s Best Cities for Foodies, TRAVEL & LEISURE MAG., http://www.travelandleisure.com/
articles/americas-best-cities-for-foodies/2 (last visited Mar. 26, 2012).
132. Josef Schmidhuber & Francesco N. Tubiello, Global Food Security Under Climate Change, 104
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S.A. 19703, 19708 (2007), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pmc/articles/PMC2148361/pdf/zpq19703.pdf.
133. Id. at 19704–05.
134. Id. at 19704.
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climate change and the food crisis to the peaking of fossil fuels, declaring these
crises are a triple threat to disadvantaged populations around the world.135
Further, biofuels hurt the world’s poor by displacing land that could be used for
agricultural food production, resulting in food shortages and higher food
prices.136 What the New Orleans case shows is that policies intended to be race
neutral can accelerate rather than alleviate the burdens suffered by vulnerable
populations. Policies must be especially sensitive to vulnerable populations, not
neutral, in order to avoid disparate impacts on these populations.
IV. DISCUSSION
This article has offered a glimpse into the disproportionate impacts of two
particular disasters in which—despite massive participation by well-organized
communities and armies of volunteers, and despite large amounts of recovery
dollars and serious debates on how to rebuild and recover—the resulting
recoveries can only be characterized as inequitable. In each example, existing
vulnerable populations shouldered disproportionate impacts. These disasters
offer only a prelude to the intensifying and disproportionate impacts of climate
change and the energy transition. Vulnerable populations in the United States
and around the world, especially in the Global South, are subject to local and
global risks that are escalating to catastrophic levels. New strategies must be
developed to address these simultaneous threats, and new discourses must be
created to prioritize them. Most of all, public policies must begin genuinely to
address the needs of vulnerable populations in order to remain relevant.
One emerging discourse within the lineage of environmental justice is
climate justice. The notion of climate justice first emerged at the 2000 Climate
Justice Summit in The Netherlands, whereby climate change was declared a
human rights issue.137 As a result of this summit, a group of environmental
justice leaders from across the country gathered to form the Environmental
Justice Climate Change Initiative (EJCC):
The Environmental Justice Climate Change Initiative was founded in 2001
shortly after thousands of people from around the world gathered in The Hague,
Germany [sic] for the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change 6th Conference of the Parties (COP6). During COP6, civil society groups
coordinated the first Climate Justice Summit as an official alternative forum to
the COP6. Grassroots leaders shared stories of the impact of climate change and
offered community-based solutions for adaptation and mitigation. Several
conference participants from the United States were inspired by the emerging
global call for Climate Justice and saw the real need to develop a domestic
counterpart.
In April 2001, these participants founded The Environmental Justice Climate
Change Initiative as a project of Redefining Progress, a California-based
environmental policy organization. The mission of the Environmental Justice
Climate Change Initiative (EJCC) is to educate and to activate the people of

135. See Shiva, supra note 5, at 19, 22–23.
136. Id.
137. Climate Justice Movements, CLIMATE INSTITUTE, http://www.climate.org/climatelab/Climate
_Justice_Movements (last visited Mar. 16, 2012).
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North America toward the creation and implementation of just climate policies
in both domestic and international contexts. EJCC membership is a diverse,
consensus-based group of U.S. environmental justice, climate justice, religious,
policy, and advocacy groups that represent hundreds of communities across the
country. The EJCC has emerged as a leading United States-based voice for justice
and equity in domestic and international climate change conversations.138

At the 2002 UN World Summit on Sustainable Development in Bali, a
diverse group of NGOs created a set of twenty-seven climate justice principles.139
In 2004, the Durban Group for Climate Justice was founded by various
grassroots organizations and people’s movements.140 At the 2007 UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change in Bali, the Climate Justice Now! coalition was
formed by several international NGOs that developed another set of climate
justice principles.141 And in 2009, the Climate Justice Action Network was
established at the Fifteenth Conference of the Parties (COP15) to the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change.142 The essence of climate justice can
be summarized in the following statement by Climate Justice Now!:
Communities in the global south as well as low-income communities in the
industrialised north have borne the toxic burden of this fossil fuel extraction,
transportation and production. Now these communities are facing the worst
impacts of climate change—from food shortages to the inundation of whole
island nations.
Inside the global climate negotiations, rich industrialised countries have put
unjustifiable pressure on Southern governments to commit to emissions
reductions. At the same time, they have refused to live up to their own legal and
moral obligations to radically cut emissions and support developing countries’
efforts to reduce emissions and adapt to climate impacts.
Climate Justice Now! will work to expose the false solutions to the climate crisis
promoted by these governments, alongside financial institutions and
multinational corporations—such as trade liberalisation, privatisation, forest
carbon markets, agrofuels, and carbon offsetting.143

Climate justice activists operating on the international stage seem to
understand the common structural condition of vulnerable populations around
the world and have created a powerful framework that includes all vulnerable
people. Environmental justice activists, typically operating locally or regionally

138. About, ENVTL JUST. & CLIMATE CHANGE INITIATIVE, http://www.ejcc.org/about/ (last visited
Mar. 18, 2012).
139. Bali Principles of Climate Justice, INDIA RES. CTR., http://www.indiaresource.org/issues/
energycc/2003/baliprinciples.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2012).
140. Who Are We?, DURBAN GROUP FOR CLIMATE JUST., http://www.durbanclimatejustice.org/
who-are-we (last visited Mar. 22, 2012).
141. Bali-CJN! Founding Presse Release, CLIMATE JUST. NOW!, http://www.climate-justicenow.org/about-cjn/history/bali-cjn-founding-presse-release/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2012).
142. Call for “System Change not Climate Change” Unites Global Movement, GLOBAL JUST. ECOLOGY
PROJECT,
http://climate-connections.org/2010/11/29/call-for-%E2%80%9Csystem-change-notclimate-change%E2%80%9D-unites-global-movement/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2012).
143. Climate Justice Now! Network, WORLD DEV. MOVEMENT, http://www.wdm.org.uk/climatedebt-campaign/climate-justice-now-network (last visited Mar. 31, 2012).
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with specific groups of vulnerable people, can benefit by bringing some aspects
of the climate justice framework into their own guiding narratives. The National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) has already begun
this transition.144 Their climate change statement highlights Hurricane Katrina in
New Orleans, coal fired power plants in Pennsylvania and Ohio, mountain top
removal in West Virginia, rising sea level on the Louisiana coast, placement of
toxic facilities based on race, and lack of healthy food access in poor communities
as examples of climate change issues.145
In 2001, Oxford Professor Norman Myers described environmental refugees
as a “new phenomenon” created by climate change.146 He defined environmental
refugees as “people who can no longer gain a secure livelihood in their
homeland because of drought, soil erosion, desertification, deforestation and
other environmental problems together with the associated problems of
population pressure and profound poverty.”147 In desperation, people seek
shelter elsewhere or migrate in search of safer and more secure livelihoods.
Presently, the UN High Commissioner on Refugees is projecting fifty million
environmental refugees by 2020.148 This is no small matter and cannot be reduced
to the sensational machinations of the green movement.
The environmental, environmental justice, and climate justice movements
are struggling to come to a compromise over differences in order to coalesce
around a common goal: the elevation of climate change to a higher priority
within the world community. The global economic crisis has reduced the chances
of climate change increasing in priority. Unfortunately, the impacts of global
warming and climate change on people have not decreased. The lack of forward
movement in reaching a binding legal agreement among nations at the recent
Climate Change Summit (COP17) in Durban, South Africa bears out this
hypothesis.149 We must now await the Rio+20 UN Conference on Sustainability
in Brazil in June 2012 for any hope of such agreement among nations.150 The
prediction of fifty million environmental refugees flooding the Global North by
2020, fleeing food shortages sparked by climate change,151 should give pause to
skeptics.
During the COP17 United Nations Climate Change Summit, Achim Steiner,
the United Nations Under-Secretary-General and Executive Director of the UN

144. See Climate Justice Initiative, NAACP, http://www.naacp.org/programs/entry/climatejustice (last visited Mar. 22, 2012).
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SOC’Y 609, 609 (2002), available at http://rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/357/1420/609.full.
pdf+html?sid=9bee75ca-5a93-48d9-8739-5097d3cb7c51.
147. Id.
148. Joanna Zelman, 50 Million Environmental Refugees by 2020, Experts Predict, HUFFINGTON POST,
Feb. 22, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/22/environmental-refugees-50_n_826488.
html.
149. See UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, COP 17, available at
http://unfccc.int/meetings/durban_nov_2011/session/6294/php/view/decisions.php (last visited
Mar. 22, 2012).
150. See EARTH SUMMIT 2012, http://www.earthsummit2012.org/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2012).
151. Zelman, supra note 148.
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Environment Programs, presented what he considers “[a] big array of options . . .
available to assist in a low-carbon, resource-efficient future for the world.”152
According to Under-Secretary Steiner:
[C]ountries, companies and communities [across the globe] are already making
significant strides: In 2010, more than $211 billion . . . was invested in new
renewable energies, more than in new fossil fuels.
In respect to solar, 17.5GW was installed in 2010, up 130 percent from 2009:
Photo voltaic (PV) installations are forecast to rise further this year by perhaps
20.5GW, taking global capacity to around 50GW—the equivalent of around 15
nuclear reactors.153

Currently, there are sixty regional and local governments taking significant
action in reducing GHGs.154 Quebec, Canada and São Paulo, Brazil, for example,
are attempting to cut GHG levels to twenty percent below 1990 levels by the year
2020.155
Steiner emphasizes the importance of jobs and how the transition to
renewable energy is a job creator.156 He reports that “[w]ith 1.3 billion people
underemployed or unemployed and with half-a-billion young people joining the
work force over the next decade,” jobs are critical.157 By 2030, employment from
renewable energy in Germany is predicted to rise to between 500 and 600
thousand jobs.158 China’s renewable energy targets for 2020 could create up to
880 thousand jobs in solar photovoltaic (PV) systems.159
V. CONCLUSIONS
The worldwide transition to a low-carbon, resource-efficient green economy
must be the goal of humanity for sustainability. Equity, however, must be
addressed in efforts to achieve global sustainability. We must ensure that as we
progress toward a green economy, the transition for disadvantaged people will
be prioritized.
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